{"id":5318,"date":"2021-04-18T17:01:25","date_gmt":"2021-04-18T17:01:25","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/manager.openweb.ro\/?p=5318"},"modified":"2021-10-15T13:33:04","modified_gmt":"2021-10-15T13:33:04","slug":"the-agency-problem-in-the-romanian-state-owned-enterprise-the-contractual-paradox","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/manager.faa.ro\/?p=5318","title":{"rendered":"The Agency Problem in the Romanian State Owned Enterprise: The \u201cContractual Paradox\u201d"},"content":{"rendered":"\t\t
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\u00a0Pages: 106-115<\/span><\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t

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Introduction<\/strong>.The first is informal and the latter is formal. Both contracts are concluded between the\u00a0<\/span>same actors. The first transaction sets the rent extraction from the firm, while the second contract establishes\u00a0<\/span>the decision-making mechanism for the allocation of the firm\u2019s resources.\u00a0<\/span>The \u201crent\u201d is not treated in this study as a surplus, as in Ricardo-Marshall model, but as a profit.<\/span><\/p>

Aim of the study<\/strong>.\u00a0<\/span>This article is an analysis of a \u201ccontractual paradox\u201d which exists in the relation between\u00a0<\/span>an agent and a principal, in the presence of rent extraction. This case focuses exclusively on the State\u00a0<\/span>Owned Enterprise \u2013 SOE in Romania. If the model built by MC Jensen and WH Meckling examines the\u00a0<\/span>agency costs occurring in the presence of an information asymmetry and conflicts of interest between the\u00a0<\/span>agent and the principal, \u201cthe contractual paradox\u201d that I consider in this article assumes that the \u201cagent\u201d\u00a0<\/span>and the \u201cprincipal\u201d cooperate to extract a rent\/profit detrimental to a State Owned Enterprise and, in this\u00a0<\/span>case, the conflict of interest between the two disappears or subsists only as regards rent extraction and risks\u00a0<\/span>sharing. The \u201ccontractual paradox\u201d refers to the coexistence of two agency contracts in the same State\u00a0<\/span>Owned Enterprise.<\/span><\/p>

Keywords:<\/span>\u00a0corporate governance, agent \u2013 principal, agency costs, rent seeking, rent extraction<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>
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\n\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tFull text sources<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/a>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Introduction.The first is informal and the latter is formal. Both contracts are concluded between the same actors. The first transaction sets the rent extraction from the firm, while the second contract establishes the decision-making mechanism for the allocation of the firm\u2019s resources. The \u201crent\u201d is not treated in this study as a surplus, as in Ricardo-Marshall model, but as a profit.<\/p>\n

Aim of the study. This article is an analysis of a \u201ccontractual paradox\u201d which exists in the relation between an agent and a principal, in the presence of rent extraction. This case focuses exclusively on the State Owned Enterprise \u2013 SOE in Romania. If the model built by MC Jensen and WH Meckling examines the agency costs occurring in the presence of an information asymmetry and conflicts of interest between the agent and the principal, \u201cthe contractual paradox\u201d that I consider in this article assumes that the \u201cagent\u201d and the \u201cprincipal\u201d cooperate to extract a rent\/profit detrimental to a State Owned Enterprise and, in this case, the conflict of interest between the two disappears or subsists only as regards rent extraction and risks sharing. The \u201ccontractual paradox\u201d refers to the coexistence of two agency contracts in the same State Owned Enterprise.
\nKeywords: corporate governance, agent \u2013 principal, agency costs, rent seeking, rent extraction <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":209,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[30,31],"tags":[83,84,226,830,831],"coauthors":[1449],"class_list":{"0":"post-5318","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","6":"category-30","7":"category-2016-vol-23-issue-1-may","8":"tag-agency-costs","9":"tag-agent-principal","10":"tag-corporate-governance","11":"tag-rent-extraction","12":"tag-rent-seeking"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/manager.faa.ro\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5318","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/manager.faa.ro\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/manager.faa.ro\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/manager.faa.ro\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/209"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/manager.faa.ro\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=5318"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/manager.faa.ro\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5318\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":8036,"href":"https:\/\/manager.faa.ro\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5318\/revisions\/8036"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/manager.faa.ro\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=5318"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/manager.faa.ro\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=5318"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/manager.faa.ro\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=5318"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/manager.faa.ro\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcoauthors&post=5318"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}